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72.36/11

15 SEP 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Support

SUBJECT : Multilateral Coordination of Draft DCIDs

1. This memorandum suggests action on your part in paragraph 9.

2. Reference is made to the request that the Office of Security review all the draft DCIDs for the purpose of determining whether there are any problems from a security standpoint. This is to advise that the draft DCIDs have been thoroughly scrutinized and, with one exception, this Office interposes no objection to the formal approval of the DCIDs during the multilateral coordination process scheduled for Wednesday, 20 September 1972. We continue to take strong exception to the proposed DCID on "Compartmentation of Sensitive Intelligence and Intelligence Information," and this memorandum sets forth our reasoning for adopting this position.

3. The draft DCID on Compartmentation proposes the establishment of a Special Security Center, under the Director of Central Intelligence, in order to advise, assist and generally act for the DCI in the discharge of his responsibilities in the establishment of community controls for the compartmented protection of intelligence. As proposed, the Chief of the Special Security Center would report to and function directly under the DCI, while having the responsibility of coordinating with the Security Committee. Most of the functions of the DCI Special Security Center are obviously in the area of security, and the SSC would be administratively, technically and logistically supported by the Office of Security.

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4. This Office does not consider the proposed DCID advisable on the basis that it creates a unit of undetermined size and composition for the purpose of carrying out basic security responsibilities without overall policy guidance, direction, and control from one logical focal point. In effect, it creates a small second Office of Security.

5. By terms of the 25 April 1962 agreement between the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense, the Office of Security was assigned the responsibility of providing uniform security policy to the National Reconnaissance Office. More recently the 1969 agreement between the DCI and the Secretary of Defense resulted in the delegation of similar responsibility to the Office of Security in developing and overseeing a security system for another interdepartmental program of high sensitivity. In substance, the existing Special Security Center has served as a coordinating focal point for the establishment of security policy on several compartmented programs (not including interdepartmental Special Intelligence).

6. The draft DCID on "Coordination of Maintenance of Security" again establishes the United States Intelligence Board's Security Committee which is traditionally chaired by the Director of Security. The proposed mission of the Committee, is to advise, assist and generally act for the DCI in the discharge of his responsibilities with respect to the protection of intelligence and intelligence information; to assist in the development and promotion of coordinated and practical security practices; and to foster the objective of providing adequate security protection consistent with the coordinated application of intelligence resources and the efficient employment of intelligence products. It is our considered opinion that the mission, functions and community responsibilities of the proposed DCI Special Security Center would conflict with and/or otherwise duplicate many of the activities being performed by the Security Committee of USIB. Although the draft proposal on Compartmentation of Sensitive Intelligence suggests that the DCI Special Security Center should "coordinate" with the Security Committee to ensure compatibility of compartmented procedures with general security practices, it would be inevitable that

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inconsistent and incompatible policy positions could be applied on security issues of interest to both components. The problem might possibly be alleviated to some extent if the Director of Security is also designated as Chief of the DCI Special Security Center, but we believe it would be in the best interests of all concerned if the Special Security Center continues to function under the cognizance of the Office of Security.

7. Another problem in the proposed DCID on Compartmentation relates to the placement of the SI milieu into the DCI Special Security Center, apparently on the premise that the Director of Central Intelligence would drastically cut back security controls in the area of Special Intelligence. This concept brings into play and immediate focus the theorem that Security is a command function. The Office of Security shares the views expressed by various Agency components which commented on this issue in the [ ] Report. In substance, it has been strongly stated that any radical change in the SI system will be strongly contested by the National Security Agency, and we should be absolutely certain what direction should be pursued on this controversial issue. Controls placed upon Special Intelligence information have international ramifications which are best known to the SIGINT Committee and the National Security Agency. In order not to fragment security responsibility for this vital source and method, it would appear to be a great mistake to divide security responsibility and authority between the SIGINT Committee and a newly created organization. We foresee many complex problems, conflicts and, at best, genuine misunderstandings and confusion resulting from such a decision.

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8. In summary, the Office of Security opposes the establishment of a DCI Special Security Center, loosely affiliated with the Office of Security, on the grounds that:

A. The organizational security structure, directly under the DCI, is inadvisable in that it creates another Office of Security.

B. There would be duplication and overlap of responsibility with the USIB Security Committee.

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C. Dividing security responsibility and authority between the SIGINT Committee and a newly created organization, not a part of the overall SIGINT command and policy structure, would cause conflict, misunderstanding and confusion at the possible expense of security.

9. Based upon the above, it is strongly recommended that the Deputy Director for Support not concur in the establishment of a Special Security Center outside the Office of Security. Although unaccepted, this has been our position during the development of the draft.

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Howard J. Osborn  
Director of Security

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Orig - Return to OS  
2 - DD/S

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Howard J. Osborn  
Director of Security

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<b>TRANSMITTAL SLIP</b>		DATE
TO: DD/Support		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS:		
FROM:		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

FORM NO 241  
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8  
WHICH MAY BE USED.

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